Abstract. Masking with random values is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks. For cryptographic algorithms combining arithmetic and Boolean masking, it is necessary to switch from arithmetic to Boolean masking and vice versa. Following a recent approach by Hutter and Tunstall, we describe a high-order Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm whose complexity is independent of the register size k. Our new algorithm is proven secure in the Ishai, Sahai and Wagner (ISW) framework for private circuits. In practice, for small orders, our new countermeasure is one order of magnitude faster than previous work. We also describe a 3rd-order attack against the 3rd-order Hutter-Tunstall algorithm, and a constant, 4th-order attack against the t-th order Hutter-Tunstall algorithms, for any t ≥ 4.
Introduction
The masking countermeasure. Masking is a very common countermeasure against side channel attacks, first suggested in [CJRR99, GP99] . It consists in masking every variable x into x = x ⊕ r, where r is a randomly generated value. The two shares x and r are then manipulated separately, so that a first-order attack that processes intermediate variables separately cannot succeed. However first-order masking is vulnerable to a second-order attack combining information on the two shares x and r; see [OMHT06] for a practical attack. Boolean masking can naturally be extended to n shares, with x = x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n ; in that case an implementation should be resistant against t-th order attacks, in which the adversary combines leakage information from at most t < n variables. It was shown in [CJRR99, PR13, DDF14] that under a reasonable noisy model, the number of noisy samples required to recover a secret x from its shares x i grows exponentially with the number of shares.
Security model. The theoretical study of securing circuits against side-channel attacks was initiated by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner (ISW) [ISW03] . In this model, the adversary can probe at most t wires in the circuit, but he should not learn anything about the secret key. The authors show that any circuit C can be transformed into a new circuit C of size O(t 2 · |C|) that is resistant against such an adversary. The construction is based on secret-sharing every variable x into n shares with x = x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n , and processing the shares in a way that prevents a t-limited adversary from leaning any information about the initial variable x, for n ≥ 2t + 1.
The approach for proving security is based on simulation: instead of considering all possible tuples of probes, which would be unfeasible since this grows exponentially with t, the authors show how to simulate any set of t wires probed by the adversary, from a proper subset of the input shares of the transformed circuit C . Since any proper subset of the input shares can be simulated without knowledge of the input variables of the original circuit (simply by generating random values), one can then obtain a perfect simulation of the t probes. This shows that the t probes do not bring any additional information to the attacker, since he could simulate those t probes by himself, without knowing the secret key.
In this paper, all our constructions are proven secure in the ISW model. More precisely, we use the refined t-SNI security notion introduced in [BBD + 16] . This enables to show that a particular Our contributions. In this paper our contributions are as follows:
• We describe a high-order Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm with complexity independent of the register size k, using a similar approach as in [HT16] , but with a proof of security in the ISW model. Our algorithm achieves security against attacks of order n − 1 for n shares, for any n ≥ 3. Our conversion algorithm has complexity O(2 n ), instead of O(n 2 · k) in [CGV14] , but for small values of n it is one order of magnitude more efficient. In Section 6 we report the execution times we achieved for both algorithms, using 32-bit registers.
• We describe a 4th order attack against the t-th order Hutter-Tunstall algorithm (with n = t + 1 shares), for any t ≥ 4. We also describe a 3rd order attack for t = 3. This implies that the conversion algorithm in [HT16] cannot offer more than second-order security 3 .
Source code. A proof-of-concept implementation of our high-order conversion algorithm, using the C language, is available at:
http://pastebin.com/CSn67PxQ
Security Definitions
In this section we recall the t-NI and t-SNI security definitions from [BBD + 16] . For simplicity we only provide the definitions for a simple gadget taking as input a single variable x (given by n shares x i ) and outputting a single variable y (given by n shares y i ). Given a vector of n shares (x i ) 1≤i≤n , we denote by x |I := (x i ) i∈I the sub-vector of shares x i with i ∈ I.
Definition 1 (t-NI security). Let G be a gadget taking as input (x i ) 1≤i≤n and outputting the vector (y i ) 1≤i≤n . The gadget G is said t-NI secure if for any set of t intermediate variables, there exists a subset I of input indices with |I| ≤ t, such that the t intermediate variables can be perfectly simulated from x |I .
Definition 2 (t-SNI security). Let G be a gadget taking as input (x i ) 1≤i≤n and outputting (y i ) 1≤i≤n . The gadget G is said t-SNI secure if for any set of t intermediate variables and any subset O of output indices such that t + |O| < n, there exists a subset I of input indices with |I| ≤ t, such that the t intermediate variables and the output variables y |O can be perfectly simulated from x |I .
The t-NI security notion corresponds to the original security definition in the ISW probing model; based on the ISW multiplication gadget, it allows to prove the security of a transformed circuit with n ≥ 2t + 1 shares. The stronger t-SNI notion allows to prove the security with n ≥ t + 1 shares only [BBD + 16] . The difference between the two notions is as follows: in the stronger t-SNI notion, the size of the input shares subset I can only depend on the number of probes t and is independent of the number of output variables |O| that must be simulated (as long as the condition t + |O| < n is satisfied). For a complex construction involving many gadgets (as the one considered in this paper), this enables to easily prove that the full construction is t-SNI secure, based on the t-SNI security of its components.
Goubin's First-order Conversion and Previous Works

Goubin's Algorithm
We first recall Goubin's first-order algorithm for conversion from Boolean to arithmetic masking [Gou01] . The algorithm is based on the affine property of the function Ψ (x 1 , r) :
As mentioned previously, all additions and subtractions are performed modulo 2 k for some parameter k, so in the following we omit the mod 2 k . Moreover we grant higher precedence to xor than addition, so we simply write Ψ (x 1 , r) = x 1 ⊕ r − r.
Theorem 1 (Goubin [Gou01] ). The function Ψ (x 1 , r) is affine with respect to r over F 2 .
Thanks to the affine property of Ψ , the conversion from Boolean to arithmetic masking is relatively straightforward. Namely given as input the two Boolean shares x 1 , x 2 such that
we can write:
for random r ← {0, 1} k . Therefore one can compute
and get the two arithmetic shares A and x 2 of
The conversion algorithm is clearly secure against first-order attacks, because the left term Ψ (x 1 , r⊕ x 2 ) is independent of x 2 (thanks to the mask r), and the right term Ψ (x 1 , r) is also independent from x 2 . The algorithm is quite efficient as it requires only a constant number of operations, independent of k.
t-SNI variant of Goubin's algorithm
In this paper our goal is to describe a high-order conversion algorithm from Boolean to arithmetic masking, with complexity independent of the register size k, as in Goubin's first-order algorithm above. Moreover we will use Goubin's first-order algorithm as a subroutine, for which the stronger t-SNI property recalled in Section 2 is needed. However it is easy to see that Goubin's algorithm recalled above does not achieve the t-SNI security notion. This is because by definition the output share x 2 in x = A + x 2 is the same as the input share in x = x 1 ⊕ x 2 ; therefore if we take O = {2} in Definition 2, we need to set I = {2} to properly simulate x 2 ; this contradicts the t-SNI bound |I| ≤ t, since in that case for t = 0 we should have I = ∅. However, it is straightforward to modify Goubin's algorithm to make it t-SNI: it suffices to first refresh the 2 input shares x 1 , x 2 with a random s. We obtain the following first-order t-SNI Boolean to arithmetic algorithm (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 GoubinSNI: Boolean to arithmetic conversion, t-SNI variant
Input: x1, x2 such that x = x1 ⊕ x2 Output: A1, A2 such that
Lemma 1 (GoubinSNI). Let x 1 , x 2 be the inputs of Goubin's algorithm (Algorithm 1) and let A 1 and A 2 be the outputs. Let t be the number of probed variables and let O ⊂ {1, 2}, with t + |O| < 2.
There exists a subset I ⊂ {1, 2}, such that all probed variables and A |O can be perfectly simulated from x |I , with |I| ≤ t Proof. We distinguish two cases. If t = 0, then the variable s is not probed by the adversary, and therefore both A 2 = a 2 = x 2 ⊕ s and A 1 = x − A 2 = x − x 2 ⊕ s have the uniform distribution separately; therefore any of these 2 output variables can be perfectly simulated with I = ∅. If t = 1, then we must have O = ∅. It is easy to see that any single intermediate variable can be perfectly simulated from the knowledge of either x 1 or x 2 , as in Goubin's original conversion algorithm, which gives |I| ≤ t as required.
Complexity analysis. We see that Algorithm 1 requires 2 random generations, 2 computations of Ψ , and 5 xors, for a total of 11 operations. In particular, the complexity of Goubin's algorithm is independent of the register size k.
High-order conversion between Boolean and arithmetic masking
The first conversion algorithms secure against high-order attacks were described in [CGV14] , with complexity O(n 2 · k) for n shares and k-bit addition in both directions. The algorithms in [CGV14] are proven secure in the ISW probing model [ISW03] , with n ≥ 2t + 1 shares for security against t probes. The arithmetic to Boolean conversion proceeds by recursively applying a n/2 arithmetic to Boolean conversion on both halves, and then performing a Boolean-protected arithmetic addition:
The arithmetic addition can be based on Goubin's recursion formula [Gou01] with complexity O(k) for k-bit register. This can be improved to O(log k) by using a recursion formula based on the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder (see [CGTV15] ); however for k = 32 the number of operations is similar. In both cases the recursion formula only uses Boolean operation, so it can be protected with n shares with complexity O(n 2 · k) or O(n 2 · log k). For the other direction, i.e. Boolean to arithmetic, it is based on the above arithmetic to Boolean conversion, and it has also complexity O(n 2 · k) (and O(n 2 · log k) with Kogge-Stone).
Recently, Hutter and Tunstall have described in [HT16] a different technique for high-order Boolean to arithmetic conversion, with complexity independent of the register size k (as in Goubin's original algorithm). However no proof of security is provided, except for second-order and thirdorder attacks. The complexity of their algorithm for n shares is O(2 n/2 ), but for small values of n the algorithm is much more efficient than [CGV14, CGTV15] , at least by one order of magnitude. In [HT16] the authors claim that the complexity of their algorithm is O(n 2 ), but it is easy to see that it must be O(2 n/2 ), because it makes 2 recursive calls to the same algorithm with n − 2 shares.
However, in this paper we describe a 4th order attack against the t-th order Hutter-Tunstall algorithm (with n = t + 1 shares), for any t ≥ 4; we also describe a 3rd order attack for t = 3; see Section 5. This implies that the conversion algorithm in [HT16] cannot offer more than secondorder security. In particular, we have not found any attack against the second-order Boolean to arithmetic conversion specified in [HT16, Algorithm 2].
High-order Conversion from Boolean to Arithmetic Masking
In this section, we describe our main contribution: a high-order conversion algorithm from Boolean to arithmetic masking, with complexity independent of the register size k, with a proof of security in the ISW model for n ≥ t + 1 shares against t probes (t-SNI security).
A simple but insecure algorithm
To illustrate our approach, we first describe a simple but insecure algorithm; namely we explain why it fails to achieve the t-SNI security property. We start from the n shares x i such that
and we must output n shares A i such that
Our tentative conversion algorithm C n is defined recursively, using a similar approach as in [HT16] , and works as follows:
1. We write
which gives using Ψ (x 1 , u) = x 1 ⊕ u − u:
From the affine property of the Ψ function, we obtain:
2. We then perform two recursive calls to the Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm C n−1 , with n − 1 shares. This gives:
3. We reduce the number of arithmetic shares from 2n − 2 to n by some additive grouping, letting
, and D n−1 ← A n−1 and D n ← B n−1 . This gives as required:
This terminates the description of our tentative algorithm. We explain why this simple algorithm is insecure. Namely if the adversary probes the n − 1 variables z i , since each z i reveals information about both x 1 and x i+1 , those n − 1 variables reveal information about x. More precisely, from the probed z i 's the adversary can compute:
Letting u = x 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n and v = x n , for n ≥ 3 we can assume that the two variables u and v are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore the adversary obtains the two variables:
and one can check that the distribution of (Ψ (x 1 , u), Ψ (x 1 , v)) depends on x = x 1 ⊕ u. Therefore, the n − 1 probes leak information about x. Moreover, due to the recursive definition of the above algorithm, the number of required probes can be decreased by probing within the recursive calls, instead of the z i 's. Namely if the adversary probes only n − 2 variables within C n−1 , this reveals information about the n − 1 variables z i 's, which in turn reveals information about x, as explained above.
The attack can be applied recursively down to a single probe. Namely one can check experimentally (for small k and n) that for randomly distributed x 1 , . . . , x n , some intermediate variables in the recursion have a distribution that depends on x = x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n ; hence the algorithm is actually vulnerable to a first-order attack.
Mask Refreshing
To prevent the above attack (and any other attack), we must perform some mask refreshing on the intermediate shares. We use the same RefreshMasks procedure as in [RP10] ; see Algorithm 2, and Figure 1 for an illustration.
Algorithm 2 RefreshMasks
Input: x1, . . . , xn
yn ← yn ⊕ ri yn,i = xn ⊕ i j=1 rj 6: end for 7: return y1, . . . , yn
In the RefreshMasks algorithm above we denote by y n,i the intermediate variables in the accumulated sum, namely for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1:
. . .
The RefreshMasks algorithm, with the randoms ri accumulated on the last column.
We add 3 applications of RefreshMasks in the previous conversion algorithm. The first application is to first expand the n input shares x i into n + 1 shares, so that we can now have n variables of the form z i = Ψ (x 1 , x i+1 ) instead of only n − 1; this is to prevent the adversary from recovering all variables z i 's. However, one must still compress to n − 1 variables for the recursive application of the conversion algorithm with n − 1 shares. This is done by using two RefreshMasks (one for each recursive application) followed by xoring the last two shares into one, to get n − 1 shares. As will be seen in the next sections, we obtain a t-SNI conversion algorithm; this is essentially based on a careful analysis of the security properties of RefreshMasks.
Secure Conversion From Boolean to Arithmetic Masking
We are now ready to describe our new high-order conversion algorithm from Boolean to arithmetic masking; as previously, our algorithm C n is defined recursively. We start from the n shares:
If n = 2, we apply the t-SNI variant of Goubin's first order algorithm, as described in Algorithm 1. For n ≥ 3, we proceed as follows.
1. We first perform a (n + 1)-RefreshMasks of the n shares x i 's and x n+1 = 0, so that we obtain the following n + 1 shares:
Therefore we still have x = a 1 ⊕· · ·⊕a n+1 . We can write as previously using Ψ (a 1 , u) = a 1 ⊕u−u:
2. Thanks to the affine property of Ψ , this gives as previously:
This gives:
We perform a RefreshMasks of the a i 's and of the b i 's, letting:
Therefore we still have:
We compress from n shares to n − 1 shares, by xoring the last two shares of the c i 's and d i 's. More precisely we let e i ← c i and f i ← d i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2, and e n−1 ← c n−1 ⊕ c n and
5. We perform two recursive calls to the Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm C n−1 :
6. We reduce the number of arithmetic shares from 2n − 2 to n by some additive grouping, letting
This completes the description of the algorithm. For clarity we also provide a formal description in Appendix A.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). The C n Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm, when taking
Proof. The proof is straightforward from the above description. The completeness property holds for n = 2 with Goubin's conversion algorithm. Assuming that completeness holds for n − 1 shares, we obtain:
and therefore completeness holds for n shares.
Complexity analysis. We denote by T n the number of operations for n shares. We assume that random generation takes unit time. We have T 2 = 11 (see Section 3.2). The complexity of RefreshMasks with n shares is 3n − 3 operations. From the recursive definition of our algorithm, we obtain:
Therefore, the complexity of our algorithm is exponential in n, namely O(2 n ), instead of O(n 2 · k) in [CGV14] ; however for small values of n our conversion algorithm is one order of magnitude more efficient; see Section 6 for implementation results.
Security. The following theorem shows that our conversion algorithm achieves the t-SNI property. This means that our conversion algorithm is secure against any adversary with at most n−1 probes in the circuit. Moreover thanks to the t-SNI property, our conversion algorithm can be used within a larger construction (for example a block-cipher, or HMAC-SHA-1), so that the larger construction also achieves the t-SNI property.
Theorem 3 (t-SNI of C n ). Let (x i ) 1≤i≤n be the input and let (D i ) 1≤i≤n be the output of the Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm C n . For any set of t intermediate variables and any subset O ⊂ [1, n] such that t + |O| < n, there exists a subset I of input indices such that the t intermediate variables as well as D |O can be perfectly simulated from x |I , with |I| ≤ t.
The rest of the section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3. The proof is based on a careful analysis of the properties of the RefreshMasks algorithm. In the next section, we start with three well known, basic properties of RefreshMasks.
Basic properties of RefreshMasks
The lemma below shows that RefreshMasks achieves the t-NI property in a straightforward way, for any t < n.
Lemma 2 (t-NI of RefreshMasks). Let (x i ) 1≤i≤n be the input of RefreshMasks and let (y i ) 1≤i≤n be the output. For any set of t intermediate variables, there exists a subset I of input indices such that the t intermediate variables can be perfectly simulated from x |I , with |I| ≤ t.
Proof. The set I is constructed as follows. If for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, any of the variables x i , r i or y i is probed, we add i to I. If x n or y n or any intermediate variable y n,j is probed, we add n to I. Since we add at most one index to I per probe, we must have |I| ≤ t.
The simulation of the probed variable is straightforward. All the randoms r i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 can be simulated as in the real algorithm, by generating a random element from {0, 1} k . If y i is probed, then we must have i ∈ I, so it can be perfectly simulated from y i = x i ⊕ r i from the knowledge of x i . Similarly, if any intermediate variable y n,j is probed, then n ∈ I, so it can be perfectly simulated from x n . Therefore all probes can be perfectly simulated from x |I . Remark 1. It is easy to see that RefreshMasks does not achieve the t-SNI property. Namely with t = 1 we can probe y n,1 = x n ⊕ r 1 and additionally require the simulation of the output variable y 1 = x 1 ⊕ r 1 . We have y n,1 ⊕ y 1 = x n ⊕ x 1 , hence the knowledge of both x 1 and x n is required for the simulation of the two variables, which contradicts the bound |I| ≤ t.
The following lemma shows that any subset of n−1 output shares y i of RefreshMasks is uniformly and independently distributed, when the algorithm is not probed.
Lemma 3. Let (x i ) 1≤i≤n be the input and let (y i ) 1≤i≤n be the output of RefreshMasks. Any subset of n − 1 output shares y i is uniformly and independently distributed.
Proof. Let S [1, n] be the corresponding subset. We distinguish two cases. If n / ∈ S, we have y i = x i ⊕ r i for all i ∈ S, and therefore those y i 's are uniformly and independently distributed. If n ∈ S, let i * / ∈ S. We have y i = x i ⊕ r i for all i ∈ S \ {n}. Moreover:
where r i * is not used in another y i for i ∈ S. Therefore the n − 1 output y i 's are uniformly and independently distributed.
The following lemma, whose proof is also straightforward, shows that when RefreshMasks is not probed, the distribution of the n output shares y i 's can be perfectly simulated from the knowledge of x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n only; that is, the knowledge of the individual shares x i 's is not required.
Lemma 4. Let (x i ) 1≤i≤n be the input and let (y i ) 1≤i≤n be the output of RefreshMasks. The distribution of (y i ) 1≤i≤n can be perfectly simulated from
Proof. We have y i = x i ⊕ r i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and:
Therefore we can perfectly simulate the output (y i ) 1≤i≤n by letting y i ← {0, 1} k for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1
Property of the initial RefreshMasks
The lemma below gives the first non-trivial property of RefreshMasks. We consider the first RefreshMasks of our conversion algorithm C n described in Section 4.3, taking as input n + 1 input shares x i (instead of n), but with x n+1 = 0. The lemma below is a refinement of the basic t-NI lemma (Lemma 2); namely we show that if at least one of the output variables y j is probed, then it can be simulated "for free", that is without increasing the size of the input index I. More precisely, we get the bound |I| ≤ t − 1 under that condition, instead of |I| ≤ t in Lemma 2. This stronger bound will be used for the security proof of our conversion algorithm; namely at Step 2 in Section 4.3 the adversary can probe t of the variables b i = Ψ (a 1 , a i+1 ), whose simulation then requires the knowledge of t + 1 variables a i . Thanks to the stronger bound, this requires the knowledge of only t input shares x i (instead of t + 1), as required for the t-SNI bound.
Below we actually prove a slightly stronger lemma: if we fix x n+1 = 0, then we can always simulate the t probes from x |I with |I| ≤ t − 1, except in the trivial case of the adversary probing the input x i 's only.
Lemma 5. Let x 1 , . . . , x n be n inputs shares, and let x n+1 = 0. Consider the circuit y 1 , . . . , y n+1 ← RefreshMasks n+1 (x 1 , . . . , x n , x n+1 ), where the randoms are accumulated on x n+1 . Let t be the number of probed variables. There exists a subset I such that all probed variables can be perfectly simulated from x |I , with |I| ≤ t − 1, except if only the input x i 's are probed. Proof. As illustrated in Figure 2 , we distinguish two cases. If x n+1 or y n+1 or any intermediate variable y n+1,j has been probed, we construct the set I as follows. If for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, any of the variables x i , y i or r i is probed, we add i to I. In the construction of I we have omitted at least one probed variable (on the column of index n + 1), and therefore we must have |I| ≤ t − 1 as required. The simulation is then straightforward and proceeds as in Lemma 2. Namely all the randoms r i are simulated as in the actual algorithm, and all probed variables x i and y i can be perfectly simulated from x i , since in that case i ∈ I. The only difference is that n + 1 need not be in I since x n+1 = 0 by definition.
We now consider the second case. If neither x n+1 nor y n+1 nor any intermediate variable y n+1,i has been probed, we construct the set I as follows. By assumption, there exists an index j such that r j or y j or both have been probed, with 1 ≤ j ≤ n; namely we have excluded the case of the adversary probing only the input x i 's. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and i = j, if x i or r i or y i has been probed, we add i to I. Moreover if x j has been probed, or if both r j and y j have been probed, we add j to I. From the construction of I, we must have |I| ≤ t − 1 as required. Namely either a single variable among r j and y j has been probed, and this probe does not contribute to I, or both r j and y j have been probed, and these two probes contribute to only one index in I.
The simulation of probed x i , r i or y i is straightforward for i = j, from the knowledge of x i . If j ∈ I, the simulation of x j , r j and y j is also straightforward. If j / ∈ I, then either r j or y j has been probed (but not both). If r j has been probed, it can be simulated by generating a random value. If y j has been probed, since we have y j = x j ⊕ r j and moreover r j does not appear in the computation of any other probed variable (since in that case r j has not been probed, nor any intermediate variable y n+1,i ), we can simulate y j as a random value in {0, 1} k . Therefore all probed variables can be perfectly simulated from x |I .
Remark 2. The lemma does not necessarily hold if we don't assume that x n+1 = 0, or if we only assume that x i = 0 for some i = n + 1. For example, assuming that x 2 = 0, the adversary can probe both y 1 = x 1 ⊕ r 1 and y n+1,1 = x n+1 ⊕ r 1 , which gives y 1 ⊕ y n+1 = x 1 ⊕ x n+1 . Hence the knowledge of 2 input shares is required to simulate the 2 probes (including the output variable y 1 ), which contradicts the bound |I| ≤ t − 1.
More Results on RefreshMasks
In this section we consider the properties of RefreshMasks required for the compression from n shares to n − 1 shares as performed at steps 3 and 4 of our conversion algorithm in Section 4.3. Namely if the adversary probes t of the variables f i 's, because of the last variable f n−1 = d n−1 ⊕ d n , this can require the knowledge of t + 1 of the variables d i 's. Without RefreshMasks the knowledge of t + 1 of the variables b i 's would be required, and eventually t + 1 of the input shares x i 's, which would contradict the t-SNI bound. In this section, we show that thanks to RefreshMasks we can still get the bound |I| ≤ t instead of |I| ≤ t + 1.
We first prove two preliminary lemmas. The first lemma below is analogous to Lemma 5 and shows that when the randoms in RefreshMasks are accumulated on x n , the corresponding output variable y n can always be simulated "for free", that is, without increasing the size of the input index I; more precisely, if we require that y n is among the t probes, then we can have |I| ≤ t − 1 instead of |I| ≤ t in Lemma 2. This will enable to show that when a subsequent compression step to n − 1 shares is performed with z n−1 ← y n−1 ⊕ y n , we can still keep the bound |I| ≤ t instead of |I| ≤ t + 1. Namely either the adversary does not probe z n−1 = y n−1 ⊕ y n and he does not benefit from getting information on two variables with a single probe, or z n−1 is probed and we can apply Lemma 6 below with probed y n ; in both cases we get |I| ≤ t instead of |I| ≤ t + 1.
Lemma 6. Let x 1 , . . . , x n be the input of a RefreshMasks where the randoms are accumulated on x n , and let y 1 , . . . , y n be the output. Let t be the number of probed variables, with t < n. If y n is among the probed variables, then there exists a subset I such that all probed variables can be perfectly simulated from x |I , with |I| ≤ t − 1.
. . . Fig. 3 . Illustration of Lemma 6. Case 1 (left): the adversary has spent two probes on the column index n, and therefore |I| ≤ t − 1. Case 2 (right): no intermediate variable is probed on the last column except yn; then ri * can play the role of a one-time pad for the simulation of yn, hence xn is not required and again |I| ≤ t − 1.
Proof. We construct the subset I as follows. If r i or x i or y i is probed for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, we add i to I. If x n or any intermediate variable y n,j (excluding y n ) is probed, we add n to I. Since by assumption y n has been probed, we only consider at most t − 1 probes in the construction of I, and therefore |I| ≤ t − 1. For the simulation we distinguish two cases. If n ∈ I, the simulation is straightforward and proceeds as in the proof of Lemma 2. Namely all the randoms r i are simulated as in the actual algorithm, and all probed variables x i and y i can be perfectly simulated from x i , since i ∈ I. This is also the case for all intermediate variables y n,j and y n , which can be simulated from x n since n ∈ I; see Figure 3 (left) for an illustration.
If n / ∈ I, then by the construction of I neither x n nor any intermediate variable y n,j has been probed, except y n . Since |I| ≤ t − 1 ≤ n − 2, there exists 1 ≤ i * ≤ n − 1 such that i * / ∈ I. The simulation then proceed as follows. For i ∈ I, we let r i ← {0, 1} k and one can perfectly simulate the probed variables r i , x i and y i . It remains to simulate y n . We can write:
From the definition of i * , the random r i * does not appear in the definition of any other probed variable. Therefore it can play the role of a one-time pad in the above equation, and we can simulate y n with a random value in {0, 1} k , without knowing x n ; see Figure 3 (right) for an illustration.
Remark 3. The lemma does not hold for other output variables. For example the adversary can probe both y 1 = x 1 ⊕ r 1 and y n,1 = x n ⊕ r 1 . Since y 1 ⊕ y n,1 = x 1 ⊕ x n , both x 1 and x n are required for the simulation, which contradicts the bound |I| ≤ t − 1.
In the previous lemma we have restricted ourselves to t < n probes (including the probe on y n ). Namely if t = n, the adversary can probe all y i 's and learn x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n = y 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ y n ; therefore the simulation cannot be performed using a proper subset I of [1, n]. In Lemma 4 we have showed that when no intermediate variables of RefreshMasks are probed, the n output shares y i can be simulated from the knowledge of x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n only. The lemma below shows that this is essentially the best that the adversary can do: when the adversary has n probes, and if one of which must be y n , then either all probes in the circuit can be simulated from x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n only, or they can be simulated from x |I with |I| ≤ n − 1. As previously this only holds if y n must be among the n probes; namely without this restriction the attacker could probe the n input shares x i directly and learn the value of the individual shares x i (and not only the xor of the x i 's); see also Remark 4 below.
As previously, this will enable to show that when a subsequent compression step is performed with z n−1 ← y n−1 ⊕ y n , if the adversary has a total of n − 1 probes, then the simulation can be performed from x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n only, or from x |I with |I| ≤ n − 1. Namely either the adversary does not probe z n−1 = y n−1 ⊕ y n and we can simulate from x |I with |I| ≤ n − 1, or z n−1 is probed and we can apply Lemma 7 below with probed y n .
Lemma 7. Let x 1 , . . . , x n be the input of a RefreshMasks where the randoms are accumulated on x n , and let y 1 , . . . , y n be the output. Let t be the number of probed variables, with t = n. If y n is among the probed variables, then either all probed variables can be perfectly simulated from x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n , or there exists a subset I with |I| ≤ n − 1 such that they can be perfectly simulated from x |I .
Proof. We first construct a subset J as in the proof of Lemma 6. If r i or x i or y i is probed for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, we add i to J. If x n or any intermediate variable y n,j (excluding y n ) is probed, we add n to J. Since by assumption y n has been probed, we only consider at most n − 1 probes in the construction of J; therefore we must have |J| ≤ n − 1.
We now distinguish two cases.
• If n ∈ J or |J| < n − 1, we can perform the simulation of probed variables from x |I with I = J ∪ {n}, which gives |I| ≤ n − 1, as in the proof of Lemma 2. Namely all probed variables r i , x i or y i can be simulated from x i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and any probed variable x n or y n,j or y n can be simulated from x n .
• If n / ∈ J and |J| = n − 1, we must have J = [1, n − 1]. Recall that in the construction of J, at most n − 1 probes are considered. This implies that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, exactly one of the 3 variables x i , y i and r i is probed. We again distinguish three cases:
• If only the variables y i 's are probed (including y n ), then as showed in Lemma 4 the simulation of the probed variables can be performed from the knowledge of x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n only.
• If r i has been probed for some i, then neither x i nor y i has been probed, and x i is not needed for the simulation. Therefore the simulation of all probed variable can be performed from x |I with I = (J ∪ {n}) \ {i}, and |I| ≤ n − 1 as required.
• If x i has been probed for some i, then neither r i nor y i has been probed. Moreover no intermediate variable y n,j has been probed except y n (since n / ∈ J). Therefore, as in the proof of Lemma 6, the random r i can play the role of a one-time pad for the simulation of y n , and x n is not required. Therefore all probed variables can be simulated from x |I , with I = J = [1, n − 1] and |I| ≤ n − 1 as required.
Remark 4. As previously, the lemma does not hold if any other output variable y i is required to be probed instead of y n . Namely the adversary can probe the n variables y 1 = x 1 ⊕ r 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n−1 and y n,1 = x n ⊕ r 1 . The xor of these n variables gives x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n , but the adversary also learns the individual shares x 2 , . . . , x n−1 . Whereas in Lemma 7, the adversary either learns x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n and nothing else, or at most n − 1 of the shares x i .
The lemma below is the main result of the section. As mentioned previously, it enables to show that when we perform the compression from n shares to n − 1 shares at steps 3 and 4 of our conversion algorithm from Section 4.3, we can still have the bound |I| ≤ t instead of |I| ≤ t + 1 when t < n; and for t = n − 1, the simulation can be performed either from x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n , or from x |I with |I| ≤ n − 1.
Lemma 8. Consider the circuit with y 1 , . . . , y n ← RefreshMasks(x 1 , . . . , x n ), z i ← y i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 and z n−1 ← y n−1 ⊕ y n . Let t be the number of probed variables. If t < n − 1, there exists a subset I with |I| ≤ t such that all probed variables can be perfectly simulated from x |I . If t = n − 1, then either all probed variables can be perfectly simulated from x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n , or there exists a subset I with |I| ≤ n − 1 such that they can be perfectly simulated from x |I .
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. We distinguish two cases. If z n−1 is not probed, the simulation is straightforward since we can apply Lemma 2 directly; we obtain that all probed variables can be simulated from x |I with |I| ≤ t. If z n−1 is probed, then we must simulate both y n−1 and y n , which corresponds to a total of t = t + 1 probes in the circuit y 1 , . . . , y n ← RefreshMasks(x 1 , . . . , x n ); see Figure 4 for an illustration. Since y n is included in this set of t probes, we can apply Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 directly. More precisely, if t < n − 1, we can apply Lemma 6 with t = t + 1 < n; we obtain that all probed variables can be simulated from x |I , with |I| ≤ t − 1 ≤ t as required. Similarly, if t = n − 1, we can apply Lemma 7 with t = t + 1 = n. As required, we obtain that either all probed variables can be perfectly simulated from x 1 ⊕· · ·⊕x n , or there exists a subset I with |I| ≤ n − 1 such that they can be perfectly simulated from x |I .
Remark 5. The lemma does not hold if the two xored output variables of RefreshMasks do not include y n (when the randoms of RefreshMasks are accumulated on x n ). For example, if we let z 1 ← y 1 ⊕ y 2 instead, the adversary could probe both z 1 = y 1 ⊕ y 2 = (x 1 ⊕ r 1 ) ⊕ (x 2 ⊕ r 2 ) and y n,2 = x n ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 , which gives z 1 ⊕ y n,2 = x 1 ⊕ x 2 ⊕ x n . Hence to simulate those 2 probes the knowledge of 3 shares is required, which contradicts the bound |I| ≤ t.
. . . Fig. 4 . Illustration of Lemma 8. If zn−1 is probed, then both yn−1 and yn must be simulated, so we can apply Lemma 6 or Lemma 7 with probed yn. If zn−1 is not probed, the simulation is straightforward, as in Lemma 2.
Note that the value x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x n in the above lemma corresponds to either a 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a n+1 or
Step 3 of our conversion algorithm from Section 4.3. In that case, the adversary has already spent n − 1 probes, and no other variable is probed. As shown in the next section, this enables to prove that these values can be simulated without knowing the input shares. Namely when the initial RefreshMasks is not probed, the distribution of a 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a n+1 is uniform because of Lemma 3, and can therefore be simulated by a random value. Similarly we have:
. Since in that case the initial RefreshMasks is not probed, the variable a 1 has the uniform distribution, hence the value b 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ b n can also be simulated by a random value. In this section we show recursively that our conversion algorithm C n described in Section 4.3 is t-SNI, based on the previous lemmas on RefreshMasks. We follow the same process as in [BBD + 15, Sect. 4.1], where the t-SNI security of a construction is deduced from the t-NI or t-SNI property of its component gadgets. The sequence of gadgets of our construction is illustrated in Figure 5 .
Proof of Theorem
The gadgets are numbered from 1 to 9, and we denote by I i the set of probed variables in Gadget i. Gadget 9 corresponds to the initial Refreshmasks at Step 1, which we denote by R. Gadget 8 is denoted by Ψ for the application of the Ψ function at Step 2. Gadgets 5 and 7 denote the two RefreshMasks performed at Step 3. Gadgets 4 and 6 denote the compression to n − 1 shares performed at Step 4. Gadgets 2 and 3 denote the recursive application of the conversion algorithm at Step 5. Finally, Gadget 1 denotes the additive grouping performed at Step 6.
From Lemma 1 the t-SNI condition is satisfied for n = 2. We now assume that C n−1 is t-SNI, and we must show that C n is t-SNI. We denote by t c the total number of probes in the circuit. Let O ⊂ [1, n] be any subset of output shares. We must show that under the condition: t c + |O| < n all t c probed variables in the circuit and all variables D |O can be perfectly simulated from x |I , for some subset I satisfying |I| ≤ t c . Gadget 1. We have D i = A i + B i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2, and D n−1 = A n−1 and D n = B n−1 . For simplicity, to avoid a change of index, we denote the last wire of the B i 's by B n instead of B n−1 , so that we can write D n = B n . We denote by P 1 the set of probed indices in Gadget 1, with , where the subsets S 1 1 and S 1 2 are defined as follows:
(1)
Gadgets 2 and 3. The gadgets 2 and 3 are recursive applications of the Boolean to arithmetic conversion, with n−1 shares. The t-SNI conditions for gadgets 2 and 3 are therefore respectively:
We stress that the two conditions in (3) are not necessarily satisfied; for example the adversary could probe the n − 1 shares A i 's directly which would give |S 1 1 | = n − 1. However, we show that at least one of the two conditions in (3) must be satisfied. Namely we obtain from (1) and (2), using |P 1 | ≤ |I 1 |:
This gives using |I 1 | + |I 2 | + |I 3 | ≤ t c and t c + |O| < n:
Now if none of the two conditions in (3) is satisfied, we get |S 1 1 |+|I 2 | ≥ n−1 and |S 1 2 |+|I 3 | ≥ n−1, hence |S 1 1 | + |S 1 2 | + |I 2 | + |I 3 | ≥ 2n − 2, which contradicts the previous inequality. Therefore at least one of the t-SNI conditions for gadgets 2 and 3 must be satisfied. We can therefore distinguish 3 cases, depending on which of the two conditions in (3) are satisfied:
• |S 1 1 | + |I 2 | < n − 1 and |S 1 2 | + |I 3 | ≥ n − 1. We obtain using |S 1 2 | ≤ |O| + |I 1 | from (2):
and therefore we must have |O| + |I 1 | + |I 3 | = |O| + t c = n − 1, which gives |I 1 | + |I 3 | = t c , which implies that there are no other probes in the circuit. In particular, we must have |I 2 | = 0, and since the t-SNI condition for Gadget 2 is satisfied, we can simulate all outputs of Gadget 2 with |S 2 | ≤ |I 2 | = 0, hence we can take S 2 = ∅. This implies that for gadgets 4 and 5, we can take S 4 = ∅ and S 5 = ∅ (see Fig. 5 ). However, since the t-SNI condition for Gadget 3 is not satisfied, we must take S 3 = [1, n − 1] and therefore S 6 = [1, n]. Since in that case the RefreshMasks at Gadget 7 is not probed, we can apply Lemma 4 and all the d i 's can be perfectly simulated from the knowledge of
only. Moreover since S 5 = ∅ and I 8 = ∅, this is the only variable that must be simulated.
, we get:
Thanks to the initial RefreshMasks (Gadget 9) which is not probed in that case, this has the uniform distribution (because a 1 has the uniform distribution from from Lemma 3), and this can therefore be perfectly simulated by a random value. Therefore we can take I = ∅ for the simulation of the entire circuit.
• |S 1 1 | + |I 2 | ≥ n − 1 and |S 1 2 | + |I 3 | < n − 1. The reasoning is similar to the previous case, with |I 1 | + |I 2 | = t c and the rest of the circuit is not probed. Since the t-SNI condition of Gadget 3 is satisfied and Gadget 3 is not probed, we can simulate all outputs of Gadget 3 with S 3 = ∅, and therefore we can take S 6 = S 7 = S 8 = ∅. Since the t-SNI condition for Gadget 2 is not satisfied we must take S 2 = [1, n − 1] and therefore S 4 = [1, n]. Since the RefreshMasks at Gadget 5 is not probed in that case, we can apply Lemma 4 and all the variables c i can be simulated from the knowledge of a 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a n+1 only. Since the initial RefreshMasks is not probed in that case, applying Lemma 3 such simulation can be performed without the knowledge of any of the input x i 's, that is with I = ∅.
• |S 1 1 | + |I 2 | < n − 1 and |S 1 2 | + |I 3 | < n − 1. This means that t-SNI condition for gadgets 2 and 3 is satisfied. Therefore, from the recursive hypothesis we have that the probed variables and output variables A |S 1 1 and B |S 1 2 of gadgets 2 and 3 can be perfectly simulated from the input variables e |S 2 and f |S 3 respectively, where:
For the rest of the proof, we can therefore assume that (4) is satisfied, since in the two other cases above the simulation of all probed variables and D |O can be performed with I = ∅.
Gadgets 4 and 5. From |S 2 | ≤ |I 2 | we must have
We apply Lemma 8 to gadgets 4 and 5, where the number of probes in Lemma 8 is t = |S 2 | + |I 4 | + |I 5 | ≤ n − 1. As in Lemma 8, we must therefore distinguish two cases:
• If |S 2 | + |I 4 | + |I 5 | < n − 1, then all probed intermediate variables and output variables in e |S 2 can be perfectly simulated from a |S 5 , where:
, which implies that the rest of the circuit is not probed. This implies as previously that S 3 = S 6 = S 7 = S 8 = ∅. Applying Lemma 8, either all probed variables in gadgets 4 and 5 and output variables e |S 2 can be perfectly simulated from a 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a n+1 , or there exists a subset S 5 with |S 5 | ≤ n − 1 such that they can be perfectly simulated from a |S 5 . In the first case, as previously we can apply Lemma 3 to the initial RefreshMasks which is not probed (moreover S 8 = ∅), and a 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a n+1 can be simulated by a random value. Hence the full circuit can be simulated with I = ∅. In the second case, we still have as previously
Cryptanalysis of the Hutter-Tunstall Boolean to Arithmetic Conversion Algorithm
In this section, we describe two attacks against the high-order Hutter-Tunstall Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm in [HT16] , breaking all the conversion algorithms except the second-order algorithm. For clarity we will use the same notations as in [HT16] and denote by n the maximum number of probes in the circuit; therefore the conversion algorithm takes as input n + 1 shares and outputs n + 1 shares, instead of n in the previous sections. Following [HT16] , we say that a countermeasures is of order n when it should be resistant against n probes (hence with n + 1 shares as input and output). Our two attacks are as follows:
• An attack of order 4 against the n-th order countermeasure, for n ≥ 4.
• An attack of order n against the n-th order countermeasure, for n ≥ 3.
Therefore the second attack is only useful for n = 3, as for n ≥ 4 the first attack is of constant order 4. In particular, we show that our second attack can be applied against the third-order algorithm explicitly described in [HT16, Algorithm 3]. Our two attacks imply that the conversion algorithm in [HT16] cannot offer more than second-order security.
In the following we do not provide a full description of the conversion algorithm from [HT16] ; for simplicity we only provide the relevant part leading to the attack; we refer to [HT16] for the full description.
Attack of order 4 against n-th order countermeasure
We have as input the n + 1 shares x , r 1 , . . . r n , where:
We copy Equation (24) from [HT16] :
The above equation means that the variable
is explicitly computed, using a certain sequence of operations following from the right-hand side of the equation. From the affine property of the Ψ function, we have:
r i , we can write:
Therefore, if the variable β is explicitly computed when evaluating (8), our attack works by probing the 4 variables β, X, α and x . From β and X = β ⊕ u − u, we obtain information about u. From α and x , this reveals information about x = x ⊕ α ⊕ u. Alternatively, if the variable β is not explicitly computed 4 , the variable Y = Ψ (β, δ 1 ) must still be explicitly computed when evaluating X. Therefore our attack works by probing the 4 variables Y , X, α and x . We obtain the two variables:
and one can check that for randomly distributed β, δ 1 , the distribution of (X, Y ) leaks information about u. Namely, the variable Y = Ψ (β, δ 1 ) = β ⊕δ 1 −δ 1 leaks information about β, which combined with X = Ψ (β, u) = β ⊕ u − u leaks information about u. From α and x , this reveals information about x = x ⊕ α ⊕ u. Hence in both cases we obtain an attack of constant order 4 against the n-th order countermeasures for any n ≥ 4.
5.2 Attack of order n against the n-th order countermeasure As previously we have as input the n + 1 shares:
We copy Equation (22) from [HT16] :
where α, µ 1 , . . . , µ n−2 , γ 1 , . . . , γ n are randomly generated values 5 . The previous equation means that the intermediate variable:
is explicitly computed, where the computation is performed according to the right-hand side of the equation. Letting as previously u := α ⊕ n i=1 r i , we obtain:
If the variable x ⊕ α is explicitly computed when computing the right-hand side of [HT16, Equation (22)] recalled above, we can probe the following n variables: X, x ⊕ α and µ 1 , . . . , µ n−2 . We can then compute:
From x ⊕ α = x ⊕ u we also know x ⊕ u. It is easy to see that for randomly distributed u, the joint variable (x ⊕ α, Y ) = (x ⊕ u, x + u) leaks information about x.
If the variable x ⊕ α is not explicitly computed when computing the right-hand side of [HT16, Equation (22)], the variable Z = Ψ (x ⊕ α, γ n ) must still be computed, which still leaks information on x ⊕ α. More precisely, our attack consists in probing the n variables X, µ 1 , . . . , µ n−2 and Z. As previously, we recover Y = x + u and from x ⊕ α = x ⊕ u we can therefore obtain the two variables:
x + u, Ψ (x ⊕ u, γ n ) One can check that for uniformly distributed u and γ n , this still leaks information about x. Therefore in both cases we have an attack of order n against the n-th order algorithm.
Application to the third-order algorithm. We show that our attack can be applied in particular against the third-order algorithm explicitly described in [HT16, Algorithm 3]. The algorithm takes as input the 4 shares x , r 1 , r 2 and r 3 , with:
x = x ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ r 3 We have:
V 29 = (x ⊕ r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ r 3 ⊕ α ⊕ γ 2 ) + γ 2 V 3 ⊕ V 43 = x + (r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ r 3 ⊕ α)
One can let as previously u := r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ r 3 ⊕ α, which gives:
V 29 = (x ⊕ u ⊕ γ 2 ) + γ 2 V 3 ⊕ V 43 = x + u and as mentioned previously one can check that for random u, γ 2 the two variables leak information about x. Hence we have a 3-rd order attack against the 3-rd order algorithm.
Operation Count and Implementation
As shown in Section 4.3, the number of operations of our Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm is given by T n = 14 · 2 n − 12 · n − 21, so it has complexity O(2 n ) independent of the register size k, while the conversion algorithm from [CGV14] has complexity O(k · n 2 ). In Appendix B we estimate the operation count of the conversion algorithm from [CGV14] ; we obtain similar results as the estimate provided in [HT16] . We summarize in Table 1 the operation count for [CGV14] (for k = 32) and for our new algorithm from Section 4.3. We see that for small orders t, our new countermeasure is at least one order of magnitude faster than previous work. Table 1 . Operation count for Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithms, up to security order t = 12, with n = t + 1 shares.
We have also implemented the algorithm in [CGV14] and our new algorithm, in C on an iMac running a 3.2 GHz Intel processor, using the Clang compiler. We summarize the execution times in Table 2 , which are consistent with the operation count from Table 1 . This confirms that in practice for small orders, our new countermeasure is at least one order of magnitude faster than previous work. Table 2 . Running time in µs for Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithms, up to security order t = 12, with n = t + 1 shares. The implementation was done in C on a iMac running a 3.2 GHz Intel processor.
B Operation Count of [CGV14]
In this section we estimate the number of operations for the Boolean to arithmetic conversion algorithm from [CGV14] . The complexity of SecAnd algorithm in [CGV14, Algorithm 1] is the same as for the AND gadget in [ISW03] , and is given by:
A n = 5 · n(n − 1) 2 + n 2 = 7n 2 2 − 5n 2
For the SecAddGoubin algorithm in [CGV14, Algorithm 3], this gives:
B n = A n + n + (k − 1) · (A n + 2n) + 2n = k · (A n + 2n) + n T n = 2 · T n/2 + 3n 2 + B n and T 1 = 1. For simplicity we assume that n is a power of 2; if this is not the case, the equation becomes more complex with two recursive calls of T n/2 and T n/2 operations respectively. Finally, for the Boolean to arithmetic conversion, we get:
T n = 2n + T n + A n + 3 · n 2 + n As shown in [CGV14] , the complexity of both conversion algorithms is O(k · n 2 ). Based on the above equations, we provide the operation count for small values of n and k = 32 in Section 6.
